The EIP 1559 improvement proposal was proposed by Vitalik Buterin in 2019, and this proposal has always attracted attention. At the same time, it was officially put on the Ethereum London hard drive in March this year.BifurcationDuring the upgrade, it is expected to be deployed to the main network next month.
The reason why the EIP 1559 improvement proposal has attracted attention is that if this measure is implemented, it will completely change the current price of gas on Ethereum.
Through the interpretation of the original document of the proposal, we can see what the proposal is about.
Ethereum’s current “first price auction” charging model is inefficient and unnecessary for users. The EIP 1559 improvement proposal proposes a method to replace the original charging model with a mechanism for adjusting basic network fees based on network requirements. The proposal creates better cost-price efficiency and reduces the complexity of the client software required to avoid paying unnecessary high fees.
The charging model of the “first price auction” is the stage we are currently in. Every time we make a transaction, the miners will prioritize the processing of the transaction with the highest bid according to the bids of all transactions, and the low bid will wait in line. As a result, many transactions have to wait a long time to be processed, which is inefficient. If you want your transaction to be packaged first, you need to increase the gas fee.
The client software mentioned at the end of the brief should refer to the wallet we usually use . When we usually use the little fox plug-in, we can see that the gas price can be selected between fast, slow and the default normal speed. Of course, you can also customize the gas price. After adopting the proposed method, the wallet no longer needs to estimate the gas cost of each transaction.
There is a BASEFEE value in the protocol, which can move up and down by 1/8 in each block. Initially, the miners adjusted this value to the target of an average gas consumption of 8 million . If gas consumption is high, increase BASEFEE, if gas consumption is low, decrease BASEFEE. The transaction sender specifies its fee by providing two values:
1) “Premium” value : The gas price is added to the BASEFEE price. It can be set to a fairly low value (for example, 1gwei) to compensate for the miner’s interest rate risk, or set to a higher value to facilitate Win the competition in the event. BASEFEE was burned and a premium was given to the miners.
2) “Upper limit” value : represents the maximum total amount that the transaction sender is willing to pay.
The EIP 1559 improvement proposal introduces a new concept, base fee (BASEFEE). The basic fee is the lowest price that the user must pay, and the basic fee will be automatically adjusted according to the actual gas consumption of the previous block.
At the same time, the user no longer specifies the gas fee when trading, but gives the maximum value that he is willing to pay and the maximum value of the packaging fee that he is willing to pay to the miner, which is a premium. For the combustion mechanism mentioned in the content, I will explain it later.
Ethereum currently uses a simple auction mechanism to price transaction fees. Users send transaction prices, miners choose the transaction with the highest bid, and the selected transaction pays their designated bid. This has led to several serious sources of inefficiency:
1) The volatility of the transaction fee does not match the transaction cost : The transaction fee on the mature blockchain, due to sufficient usage, so the block is full, but this is often very unstable. On Ethereum, the minimum fee is usually around 2 gwei (10^9 gwei = 1ETH), but sometimes it rises to 20-50 gwei, and even once it rises to more than 200 gwei. This has caused serious inefficiency. Because when the gas price is 200 gwei, the cost of the network accepting more transactions into the block is actually 100 times that of 2 gwei. In these two cases, 8 million gas and 8.02 million gas are not the same.
2) Unnecessary delay for users : Due to the hard gas limit of each block, coupled with the natural fluctuation of transaction volume, transactions often have to wait for several blocks to be included, but this is not helpful in society ; Since there is no “slack” mechanism, which allows one block to be larger and the next block to be smaller to meet the needs of each block, no one obviously benefits.
3) The inefficiency of the first price auction : In short, the current method is that the sender of the transaction publishes a transaction with a fee, and the miner chooses the transaction with the highest payment, and everyone pays their bid. The efficiency is very low, so it needs Complex cost estimation algorithms, even these algorithms do not work well in the end, leading to frequent cost overpayments.
4) no block rewarding block chain unstable nature : In the long run, there is no issue of block chain (including Bitcoin and Zcash) intends to completely turn rewarded by miners from transaction fees. Past results have shown that this can lead to a lot of instability, encourage dug steal transaction fee “sister Block”, open the provision of more powerful selfish mining attack vectors and so on. There are no good mitigation measures to solve this problem.
With the rapid increase of ecological development and the number of participants, the gas fee of Ethereum has been criticized and jokingly called the “noble chain” by users. The reason is that the gas fee is too high compared to the single price. In other ecosystems such as bsc, the price is lower. A lot of low-cost and people-friendly. According to the data of QKL123, it can be seen that the total daily gas consumption of ETH has continued to rise over the years.
This data dimension reflects the sum of the gas consumed by all operations on the chain each day. Gas can be considered as a unit of computing resources. The user gives the Gas Price for each unit of operation resource, thus competing with other bidders. Obtain computing resources.
The selfish mining mentioned at the end of the original text is an attack on Bitcoin mining and incentives. A malicious miner who can conduct selfish mining has an advantage in computing power. When he digs a block, he chooses to keep it instead of publishing it. When he continues to dig the second block, he announces both blocks together. At this time You can get more mining rewards.
Selfish mining leads to chain forks through the advantage of computing power. Its purpose is to obtain more rewards and cause other honest miners to do useless work. Moreover, this kind of attack will not destroy the trust consensus of the original blockchain and cause the price of the currency. Fell.
The EIP proposal starts with a BASEFEE amount, which is adjusted up and down by the agreement according to the degree of network congestion. In order to adapt to this system, the network capacity will be increased to 16 million gas, so that the 50% utilization rate matches our current 8 million gas limit. When the network capacity is greater than 50%, BASEFEE will slightly increase, and when the capacity is less than 50%, it will slightly decrease. Because these increments are restricted, the maximum difference in BASEFEE between blocks is predictable. This allows the wallet to automatically set gas fees for users in a highly reliable manner. It is expected that most users do not need to manually adjust gas fees even during periods of high network activity. For most users, BASEFEE will be automatically set by their wallet, and a small fixed amount called “tip” will be added to compensate miners (such as 0.5 gwei).
An important aspect of this upgraded charging system is that miners can only keep tips. BASEFEE is always burned (that is, it is destroyed by the agreement). Burning is important because it prevents miners from manipulating fees in order to extract more fees from users. It also ensures that only ETH can be used to pay for Ethereum transactions, consolidating the economic value of ETH within the Ethereum platform.
In the improvement plan, the 50% utilization rate of the guaranteed block is maintained by increasing the network capacity. When the network capacity is greater than 50%, the basic cost will increase, and vice versa. But this increment has an upper limit.
On the other hand, the improvement plan introduces the concept of tip, the basic cost will be completely burned, and the tip belongs to the miner. Users tip miners to incentivize them to package and process their own transactions. In this case, the income of miners will be changed from the original block reward and all gas fees to block rewards and tips, and the income will decrease. This is also the reason why many mining pools oppose it.
The burning mechanism actually creates a kind of deflation for Ethereum, which will correspondingly push up the price of ETH in the short term. It seems that after the implementation of the improvement plan, if you want to achieve the ultimate goal of reducing gas fees, you may have to wait for the 2.0 and layer2 solutions.
The original English text of the improvement proposal: https://learnblockchain.cn/docs/eips/eip-1559.html